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Abstract 
Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in 
the Olympic and Sports Movement:  
Perceptions of Athletes and Executives in the Elite sport in Colombia 
Mauricio Hernandez Londoño 
Global Sport Management, Department of Physical Education 
The Graduate School 
Seoul National University 
 Good governance in sport is a big issue in international sport management. Despite 
institutional efforts to solve these problems, scandals in sport administration are still happening. 
The concept of good governance in sport is addressed by democratic values and corporate 
management. The purpose of this study was to compare athletes' and executive board members' 
perception of the effectiveness of the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in the 
Olympic and Sport Movement (PGG) in elite sport in Colombia. This study examined knowledge, 
implementation and perception of the (PGG). The sample consisted of 62 elite athletes and 30 
executives. Respondents completed an online questionnaire that included seven principles such as 
management, democracy, integrity, transparency, solidarity, athlete’s participation and autonomy. 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the knowledge, implementation and 
perception of the PGG among participants. Overall, most of the participants do not know the PGG 
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(N=54, 83%). Into the athletes’ group, most of them do not know the PGG (N=50 out of 62); while 
into the executives’ group, most of them know the PGG (N=25 out of 29). There was a significant 
difference in the scores for each one of the seven principles (p<.0001). The perception of the 
implementation of PGG in elite sport in Colombia are statistically different between athletes and 
executives. All categories had negative means from athlete’s perspective, with the exemption of 
athletes’ representation (M= 0.028) and autonomy’s principles (M= 0.188). The executives had 
overall better perception of the application of PGG than athletes, all their means were positives. 
Implementing policies such as good governance requires diverse approaches. If the NOC wants to 
implement the PGG with themselves and national federations, it should start providing education.  
 
 
Keywords: Good Governance, Sport Governance. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Questions of ethics, governance and corruption are closely linked (Chapelett, 2013). 
Journalists and scholars point a crisis in global sport management after years of scandals and 
allegations of corruption within International Sport Organizations. As it appears in the literature, 
the governance concept becomes popular when allegations of corruption and mismanagement 
appear in corporate and non-profit organizations (Chapelett, 2016). 
Since the 1960’s, European States have tried to regulate sport establishing a legislative 
framework for sport organizations at a national level (Chapelett, 2013). The concept of governance 
gained more interest when the Salt Lake City scandal was exposed by the press. As a response 
from the Olympic Movement, the International Olympic Committee (IOC in after) operationalized 
the concept under the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in Sport (PGG in after), and 
is requested as mandatory to be adopted for all members of the Olympic Movement (IOC, 2008a).  
As a result, the European Union have funded several universities to assess governance in 
international and national sport organizations. These partnership has developed projects such as 
BIBGIS (Basic Indicators for Better Governance in International Sport) (Chappelet, Jean-Loup 
and Mrkonjic, 2013), SGO (Sports Governance Observer) (Geeraert, 2015) and others funded by 
the Olympic movement such as Governance Task Force (GTF) supported by ASOIF (Association 
of Summer Olympic International Federations) (ASOIF, 2017) and (ASOIF, 2018). 
The problem behind governance goes beyond the establishment of parameters of good 
governance; as Gabriella Banttaini said in the International Forum for Sports Integrity “we have 
been talking about good governance and tackling corruption now as far as I know for twelve years, 
yet the scandals continue (…) and the universal governance principles of the IOC have not yet had 
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the transformative effect on the process and culture on international sport organizations that 
people like me helped” (IOC, 2017b). 
The study of governance in sport is complex because the nature of sport organizations and their 
legal constitution. Sports organizations are constituted as non-profit organizations. Under this 
category, fit a broad range of organizations, from International Federations until local sport clubs, 
with different resources and capabilities, they operate under similar legal framework, but diverse 
range of motivations, standards of governance, challenges and practices.  
When the PGG in the Olympic and Sport Movement were published, the IOC expected the 
adoption and implementation by the IF and the NOC. The questions of this research are: Do the 
executives of elite sport in Colombia know the PGG? Do elite athletes in Colombia know the PGG? 
Do they think those principles comply in the management of the elite sport in Colombia?  
1.2. Objective 
The literature review in governance in sport shows greater development in Europe and 
developed countries. Many initiatives from diverse organizations are acting to increase good 
governance in elite sport. Intergovernmental organizations such as the European Union, 
governments in Australia, New Zealand, the UK; the NGO such as Play The Game, New FIFA 
Now, regulators like IOC Ethics commission, World Antidoping Agency and more recently the 
IPACS (International Partnership Against Corruption in Sport) supported by the IOC are 
examples of it. Public debate on governance in sport has never take part in Colombia such as 
happened in Europe or developed countries.  
This feature has limitations. Firstly; all these organizations and initiatives take place in 
Europe among developed countries, showing a limited part of the problem and the solution; 
12 
 
secondly, the language barriers keep off the public debate in countries where English is not 
understood or spoken. There are few academic research in this field in Latin America, where the 
corruption index is higher than any other countries (Transparency, 2016). 
When the Basic Universal Principles of Governance in sport were presented by the IOC in 
2010, they were mandatory for International Federations and National Olympic Committees. The 
response of other organizations was to adopt their own rules of good governance: the UCI 
(Cycling), FIFA (Football), FILA (wrestling), and FIBV (Volleyball) trying to preserve their 
autonomy (Chapelett, 2013). With this research I want to know what was the response of the 
elite sport system organizations in Colombia?  
This study is a contribution to the field of researching in sports policy and management, 
adding new perspectives of the problem from countries like Colombia. In this country, 
corruption is considered systematic in both public and private organizations. With this research it 
is intended to: 
RQ1. To evaluate athletes' and executive board members' knowledge of the Basic Universal 
Principles of Good Governance in the Olympic and Sport Movement in Elite Sport in Colombia. 
RQ2. To find out the implementation of Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in 
the Olympic and Sport Movement among athletes and executive board members of Elite Sport in 
Colombia. 
RQ3. To compare athletes' and executive board members' perception of the Basic Universal 
Principles of Good Governance in the Olympic and Sport Movement. 
 
13 
 
1.3. Significance  
Sport is facing a lack of credibility. Corruption in sport has been well documented 
worldwide. Athletes taking illegal substances, match-fixing and bribes have produced a 
governance crisis and lack of credibility in International Sport Organizations. Part of this 
problem occurs because of the nature of these organizations. They are non-profit organizations 
running huge global businesses. These characteristics, plus a lack of transparency in voluntary 
management board members, and excessive commercialization in sport create a potential 
environment for corruption. Cheating in sport or inside sport organization is against values of 
excellence and fair play. The public conversation about good governance in sport in Colombia 
never have taken part. This research contributes on it.  
The IOC, as the authority of the Olympic system, they established the Basic Universal 
Principles of Good Governance in the Olympic and Sport Movement and made it mandatory its 
application for International Federations (IOC, 2008a). In Europe, they ran several studies to 
define the principles of good governance in sport. These studies were under the scope of two 
approaches: Corporate and Democratic Governance. The Basic Universal Principles of 
governance in sport (PGG) are result of one of these studies (Chapelett, 2013).  
By their side, instruments and tools to measure governance have been developed in European 
Universities in the highest ranked countries on the corruption perception index, all funded by the 
European Union (Alliance, 2017; ASOIF, 2017; Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 2013; 
Geeraert, 2015). Renowned scholars such as Chapelett, suggests running local studies to 
deconstruct the concept of good governance and translate it on evidence and measurable 
indicators (Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 2013). 
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This research compares athletes’ and board members’ perception of the PGG application in 
elite sport in Colombia. A t-test will run with data collected from the questionnaire in a form of 
tables, charts and graphs. The respondents are active Colombian athletes involved in elite sport 
competitions under the called Olympic Cycle (Bolivarian, South American, Center and 
Caribbean, and Pan-American and Olympic Games) by the Colombian Olympic Committee; and 
board members of the Colombian Olympic Committee (COC) or the National Federations (NF). 
The PGG may have implementation issues. Firstly; Eurocentrism, indicators and tools were 
developed by European scholars at European Universities. The concepts of transparency, 
democracy, integrity, solidarity and ethics have different meanings and representations in Latin 
American countries. Secondly; the broad character of the PGG (Chapelett, 2013); sport 
organizations under the Olympic System are diverse in size and resources, indeed in the same 
country. Thirdly; a lead by example perspective is the IOC’s approach. They expect that all 
members under the rule of Olympic Charter understand and follow the rules as they promote (S. 
S. Andersen, Houlihan, & Ronglan, 2015). And lastly; fear of respondents, board members think 
resources will be given based on their answers. Typical work cultures showcase successes and 
hide failures (Sandberg & Grant, 2017). Managers and board members currently fill a request of 
compliance with standards, with no desired changes in management or practices. The public 
debate about governance in sport have been and are still absent. 
Finally, the studies about effectiveness are quite complex because the meaning of the 
concept. Indeed, supported by the thesis that effectiveness is a social construction, it was found 
by (Herman & Renz, 1999) that when asked how effective they think a certain organization is, 
most people find it easy to respond. When asked why, some reply that the organization is 
achieving its goals, others state that the CEO is effective, and still others cannot find anything to 
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say. One of the contributions of this study, is that establishes an operative definition of Basic 
Universal Principles of Governance for the elite sport system in Colombia. This could be useful 
in the future for assessment or advisory goals. 
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Chapter 2. Review of Literature 
 
The literature review will be presented in several sections. There are covered the 
effectiveness concept, models and theories. The concept of governance, theories, approaches and 
the concept of sports governance. Later, it is covered the tools to assess sport governance, the 
background of The Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in the Olympic and Sport 
Movement, and the specific context of Elite sport in Colombia. Finally, there are showed the 
previous research in the  area of sports governance. 
2.1.Effectiveness  
The concept of effectiveness has been broadly covered by scholars in the field of corporate, 
non-profit organizations and sports management. Authors such as Quinn and Cameron (1983) 
cited by (Daprano, Pastore, & Costa, 2008) noted that organizational effectiveness has been 
described as a contradictory concept in management. A number of authors have studied 
organizational effectiveness from different perspectives and with a different criteria (Herman & 
Renz, 1999). Given the importance of organizational effectiveness to sport managers, researchers 
have examined effectiveness in a variety of sport organizations (Chelladurai, 2014). 
Organizational effectiveness is described as which extent the organization have reached its goals. 
This approach puts trust in the goals and assumes that those goals are clear enough. They are 
known by all members in the organization, stable, specific and easily measured in a timely and 
appropriate manner (Herman & Renz, 1999). Obviously, this approach has been criticized 
because those assumptions in practice are not clear or problematic.  
The goals model approach can be used for evaluating their elite sport programs. However, 
this approach is rejected for the evaluation of mass sport programs (Chelladurai & Haggerty, 
1991). 
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To overcome the faults of this assumption, much of the literature about organizational 
effectiveness describes alternatives. Scholars such as Chelladurai have described five significant 
models of organizational effectiveness, including the goals model, system resources, processes 
model, multiple constituency and competing values model (Chelladurai, 2014). 
In the goals model of effectiveness, goal attainment is the criterion of effectiveness. The 
model is useful only to the extent that goals are specific and unambiguous and goal attainment 
can be easily measured (Chelladurai, 2014). In the system resource model, the input of resources 
is the measurement of organizational effectiveness because these inputs are indicative of the 
acceptability of the outputs. However, the model’s applicability is limited when an 
organization’s inputs are underwritten by a superior authority like the government does in most 
of the elite sports systems.  
The process model is focused on the activities and tasks to get the goals. This approach put 
more attention in the learning processes than in outcomes, the danger lies in treating a process as 
the one best way, thereby making it an end in itself. Organizational effectiveness is considered 
multidimensional. To understand the complexity of it, it’s necessary to consider the goals, 
systems and process models. For example, for Bayle and Madella, the effectiveness of National 
Sport Organizations can be assessed from six perspectives (Bayle & Madella, 2002) : 
1. Institutional: To strength national teams and gain new members.  
2. Social-internal: A positive and friendly environment among employees of the 
organization and between supervisors and employers. 
3. Social-external: To stablish good relationships with external stakeholders by 
achieving organizational goals.  
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4. Economic-financial: Securing resources and managing financial ties within public 
institutions. 
5. Promotional: Increasing media coverage and creating public awareness of the 
organization. 
6. Organizational: Managing the organization according to the environmental demands. 
Connolly et al. criticized the assumption of the goal and system resource models of 
effectiveness for their assumption that ‘it is possible, and desirable, to arrive at a single set of 
evaluative criteria, and thus at a single statement of organizational effectiveness’. They 
proposed the multiple-constituency model, a model with ‘a view of organizational 
effectiveness in which several (potentially, many) different effectiveness statements can be 
made about the focal organization, reflecting the criterion sets of different individuals and 
groups we shall refer to as ‘constituencies’’. Basically, the idea of this approach is that 
different constituencies hold different goals (Connolly, Conlon, & Deutsch, 1980). 
In addressing the varying perspectives of its constituents, an effective organization 
engages in contradictory activities, which contributes to the paradox of organizational 
effectiveness. This paradox says that ‘Organizational effectiveness is inherently paradoxical. 
To be effective, an organization must possess attributes that are simultaneously 
contradictory, even mutually exclusive’. In fact, Cameron (1986) found that ‘the 
organizations that achieved the highest levels of effectiveness were also those that satisfied 
the most separate constituency group expectations, even when different constituencies held 
contradictory expectations. Highly effective organizations were paradoxical in that they 
performed in contradictory ways to satisfy contradictory expectations’ (Cameron, 1986). 
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Despite the complexity of effectiveness and his assessment, the most appropriate approach to 
know the perception of the athletes and executives of the Basic Universal Principles of Good 
Governance in Elite Sport is the goals approach. One of the earliest approaches used to assess 
organizational effectiveness, specifically in sport organizations, was the goals approach 
(Daprano et al., 2008). This approach focuses on the goals or outputs of an organization and 
evaluating how well the organization meets those goals. Following the same study, the goals of 
the organization are an important way of communicating the values of the association both to 
members and to external constituent groups, such as sponsors, suppliers, and the general public. 
The strength of this approach is providing a systematic way of evaluating organizational 
effectiveness. In addition, using the goals approach offers an opportunity to capture the 
perspectives of different internal constituent groups (Daprano et al., 2008). 
One limitation on this regard, is that The IOC do not offer specific metrics on PGG 
application, indeed, the IOC stated that, can more than 100 indicators can be derived from it 
(Chapelett, 2016). The PGG provide dimensions and sub-dimensions which were used to 
establish a goal approach to conduct this research. Using the dimensions as a guide to establish 
the goals, they formulated seven goals related to sport organizations: (a) To comply his mission, 
vision and strategy. (b) To be governed under democratic values. (c) To have high levels of 
ethical standards. (d) To be transparent in the management of resources. (e) To be equal in the 
distribution of his resources. (f) To be focused on the development of the athletes. (g) To be free 
of political or commercial interference.  
The professors Robert Herman and David Renz (Herman & Renz, 1999) have developed six 
theses about the effectiveness of public benefit charitable nonprofit organizations (NPOs) which 
will be useful foreword in the analysis of governance in nonprofit sport organizations. These 
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theses are: (a) Nonprofit organizational effectiveness is always a matter of comparison. (b) 
Nonprofit organizational effectiveness is multidimensional and will never be reducible to a 
single measure. (c) Boards of directors make a difference in the effectiveness of NPO, but how 
they do this is not clear. (d) More effective NPOs are more likely to use correct management 
practices. (e) Nonprofit organizational effectiveness is a social construction. (f) Program 
outcome indicators as measures of NPO effectiveness are limited and can be dangerous 
(Chelladurai & Haggerty, 1991). 
2.2.Governance  
The concept of governance is the result of the mix between corporate and political 
governance. It is known as systemic governance. This concept was presented by Chapelett in the 
Handbook of Sport Policy. The first has his origin in corporate (or organizational) sector and it 
was promoted by the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development OECD, to adopt managerial behaviors and practices in governmental and non-
governmental organizations with stakeholders, rather than shareholders. The second approach 
(political governance) coincides with the New Public Management movement, who seeks to 
apply management techniques used for private companies to public administration (Chapelett, 
2013). Under this definition; multiple stakeholders intervene in sports governance.  
The concept is used for a number of social, economic and political practices in several 
spheres of social life. These include policy making, regulation, setting of rules, norms and 
standards or more broadly when it comes to the study of exercising authority (Bruyninckx, 
2012). According to Chapelett, ‘the concept became important in management and political 
sciences in the 1990s and the term has now become part of the common lexicon, thanks to the 
adoption by intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank’ (Chapelett, 2016). Interest 
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in corporate governance as a field of research was first sparked by a series of failures in 
corporate governance in the UK in the early 1980s (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). Indeed, standards 
of corporate governance have been stablished as a product of corporate governance failures 
(Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007) It’s no different when applied to the sporting world. It started to call 
attention towards governance in 1997, when the Australian Standing Committee on Recreation 
and Sport identified a major concern amongst the sporting community was a ‘perceived lack of 
effectiveness at board and council level in national and state sporting organizations’. A definition 
presented by Hoye and Cuskelly in the book Sports Governance, says that ‘organizational 
governance is the system by which the elements of an organization are directed, controlled and 
regulated’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). According to them ‘governance deals with issues of policy 
and direction for the enhancement of organizational performance as well as ensuring statutory 
and fiduciary compliance’(Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). In other words, governance is the way a 
system is managed, including the relationships with stakeholders, accountability, transparency 
and effectiveness. Other organizations such as the OECD says that governance ‘helps to provide 
a degree of confidence that is necessary for the proper functioning of a market economy’ 
(OECD, 2016). 
Other definitions of governance came from the field of corporate and nonprofit sectors. 
They have similarities and differences between them. While corporate governance deals with 
profit-seeking and they are focused on enhancing shareholder value, nonprofit governance are 
concerned with the governance of voluntary organizations that seek to provide services for 
individuals in a variety of activities. Corporate and nonprofit organizations both have boards of 
elected or appointed individuals to govern their activities and are the subject of a variety of 
accountability mechanisms to their stakeholders. (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). 
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2.3.Governance Theories  
Theoretical framework to study governance is described by scholars cited by Hoyle 
(2007). ‘Some of the major theories proposed to shed light on how the governance function is 
enacted within sport, corporate and nonprofit organizations include: agency theory, stewardship 
theory, institutional theory, resource dependence theory, network theory, stakeholder theory, a 
democratic perspective and managerial hegemony theory’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). Each of 
these theories describes the interest focuses of board members, managers and stakeholders, the 
recommended source of board members and the role of the board. 
Agency theory emphases on the internal monitoring issues of governance. For this 
approach, shareholders have different interests from managers. Shareholders’ interests should 
prevail in decisions concerning the operation of an organization. On the other side, managers 
(agents) should be subject to extensive checks and balances and monitoring to avoid 
mismanagement or misconduct of managers. This focus helps to explain partially how 
governance systems work. One limitation in sport is that there are no shareholders to allocate 
financial outcomes. A practical example of  this approach is the guidelines for good governance 
in the UK in 2004, which emphasize the need for the board to monitor compliance issues (Hoye 
& Cuskelly, 2007).  
 Stewardship’s theory, focuses on internal monitoring but starts from the opposite point 
of view, ‘managers are motivated by a need for achievement, responsibility, recognition and 
respect for authority, rather than seeking to maximize their own interests over those of 
shareholders’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).  
Institutional resource dependence and network theories, seek to explain ‘how 
organizations relate to their external environment and acquire scarce resources’ (Hoye & 
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Cuskelly, 2007). Under this approach, organizations adopt their governance models to obtain the 
resources they need to comply their mission. This is a clear example of how organizations are 
influenced to adopt traditional federated models. 
Resource dependence theory proposes that ‘organizations are dependent on other 
organizations for survival and therefore need to manage their relationships with other 
organizations to ensure they get the resources and information they need’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 
2007) 
Network theory, intends to explain how organizations relate to their environment. 
Stakeholder theory, examines the ‘relationships between organizations and their 
stakeholders and conceptualizes organizations as a series of relationships and responsibilities for 
which the governance framework must account’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). This is true for all 
organizations nowadays, which must comply with multiple stakeholders such as government, 
sponsors, athletes, board members and managers. For Hung (1998) cited by Hoyle, 
‘organizations are not responsible to their shareholders or custodians but also to a wider range of 
societal groups’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). 
Managerial hegemony theory postulates ‘that although the key organizational 
stakeholders are legally in control of their organization, they rarely have effective control 
because it has been ceded to a new managerial class’. 
Nowadays is not possible to understand the complexity under governance in non-profit 
sport organizations, it is necessary, to adopt a ‘multi-paradigm approach to allow the paradoxes, 
ambiguities and tensions involved in governance’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). 
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In addition, the participation of professional managers, specialized agents in the industry 
and pressure from government and other stakeholders has challenged the decision-making 
processes in these organizations, and leading a reduction in volunteer control of non-profit sport 
organizations (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). 
2.4. Sport Governance  
The term first look hold in 1998, during the Salt Lake City Scandal (Transparency, 
2016b). After that, the IOC had to do important reforms such as setting up an ethics commission, 
drawing up a code of ethics to sanction unacceptable behaviors and limiting terms of office (For 
example a maximum of 12 years for IOC president). Other important reforms were to accept new 
members representing athletes, National Olympic Committees (NOCs) and International 
Federations (IFs). The scandal was also used to create the World Antidoping Agency in 1999 in 
order to ‘fight against a phenomenon that sports organizations had proved unable to control and 
govern alone’ (Transparency International, 2016). 
The word ‘governance’ appeared in the Olympic Charter for the first time in 2004, while 
‘The IOC Executive Board approves all internal governance regulations relating to its 
organization’ (Chapelett, 2016). 
Since the early 2000’s, innumerable definitions of governance have been put forward; 
Chapelett and Mrkonijc identified more than 35 sets of good governance principles in sport. The 
IOC systematically refers to more than 100 indicators that can be deducted from the PGG, even 
though they have proved difficult to apply (Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 2013). 
The Australian Sports Commission (ASC) defined sport governance in 2004 as ‘the 
structures and processes used by an organization to develop its strategic goals and direction, 
25 
 
monitor its performance against these goals and ensure that its board acts in the best interest of 
the members’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). In recent upgrading of his approach, ‘Governance 
structures significantly affect the performance of sporting organisations. Ineffective governance 
practices not only impacted sport but also undermined confidence in the Australian sports 
industry as a whole.’ (ASC, 2015) Despite this, Hoyle says that ‘there is no universal consensus 
about what sports governance is’. The former Sport and Recreation New Zealand (SPARC) now 
Sport New Zealand provides an undated definition of sport governance as ‘the process by which 
the board; ensures the organizations complies with all legal and constitutional requirements; sets 
strategic direction and priorities; sets high-level policies and management performance 
expectations;  characterizes and oversees the manages of risks; and monitors and evaluates 
organizational performance in order to exercise its accountability to the organizations and 
owners’ (Sport New Zealand, 2017). As it is clarified in that paper, the governance definition 
identifies key elements of governance based on governance as performance as it will show later.  
It also implies a separation of roles between the board and management and highlights some 
aspects of those relationships. 
Despite generalized concern about the governance in sport, awareness of poor or 
ineffective governance practices in sport organizations are not a new phenomenon (Hoye & 
Cuskelly, 2007). Many of the governance problems in sports organizations occur by a failure in 
the definition of the roles of board members, or they are not prepared to do their duties. The 
common governance challenges for sport organizations commented by (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007) 
could be grouped in two categories. First, related to board members and their roles. For example 
boards focusing too much on operational and reviewing decisions rather than making decisions 
or steering strategic issues. Also, the boards failing to define appropriate accountability 
26 
 
measures, results to achieve, defining responsibilities, managing relationships with staff, and 
providing a framework for board members to carry out their duties. Second, with human 
resources and their education, training and performance (for example, members reactive rather 
than proactive, the wrong people appointed to the board or poor skilled or inexperienced board 
members) (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). 
The broad concept of sport, the incremental money from government, betting and 
advertising industries, the participation of multiple stakeholders, the social uncertainty of sport, 
and the request of autonomy by the sport organizations side, make the governance of sports 
organizations more complex. ‘Governance is an important issue for sport and for the 
organizations that co-produce sport (clubs, federations, etc.), which increasingly have to work in 
conjunction with public bodies, nongovernmental organizations (NDOs), other non-profit 
organizations and commercial companies, most notably sports equipment companies, sponsors 
and the media’ (Transparency, 2016b).  
UK Sport (2004) identified that governance problems in sport organizations have 
emerged because a lack of adequate controls, monitoring and reporting lines, individuals having 
inadequate skills and a lack of succession planning. (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007)  
Other scholars (Misener, 2012), show the concept of sport governance from three 
different approaches; governance for performance, governance for networks and good 
governance. In the first approach, governance is seen as a steering mechanism. The emphasis is 
on the capacity of reaching goals. The focus in this approach is efficiency and effectiveness. So, 
in this approach, governance is perceived as performance. The second interpretation is focused 
on the process of rules and norm settings and highlights their networked nature. Participatory or 
networked governance is compared to traditional top-bottom state-centered forms. The process is 
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the focal point of this approach. And third, governance is often used in the context of 
international organizations such as The World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. It refers 
to ‘good governance’ as qualities such as legitimacy, democracy, transparency, clear legal and 
ethical frameworks, etc. It sets a sort of normative benchmark by which to judge governance 
practices (Misener, 2012). 
Governance in sport is particularly self-steered oriented topic, ‘The world of sport has 
predominantly managed to live by its own set of rules and regulations and has for a long time 
objected to state intervention at the national and certainly the international level’ (Misener, 2012) 
Despite this, they have escaped to the rules against monopoly, competition or regulatory 
competences and it has become a point of serious debate within the European Union. 
The sport sector is considered rule-driven sector; ‘the sport world is driven by, and often 
obsessed with rules’. As it writes Bruyninckx, they are extremely rule-driven sectors. He shows 
with examples in many leagues, that ‘the connection between the rules of the game and the 
economic reality of the sport is abundantly obvious.’ They state the rules of the game, but these 
rules do not always coincide with broader societal conventions. For example, ‘players in many 
sports can use several levels of violence without much fear of a criminal charge being brought 
under the normal legal system’ Also, they can choose monopolies, set contract rules, have 
internal tax systems, design solidarity mechanisms, control the behavior of their athletes and so 
on (Bruyninckx, 2012). 
There are other characteristics presented by Bruyninckx to analyze the governance of 
sport, those are the commercialization, the anti-regulation attitude, the dominant position of sport 
organizations. 
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Commercialization; the rapid, massive and global commercialization of sport. Several 
researches and journalists cited by Bruyninckx say that ‘the commercial character has become 
the most defining element and driving force’ (Bruyninckx, 2012). 
Anti-regulation attitude; ‘the powerful actors in sport have shown objections against 
more public control over norm setting and regulation’ (Bruyninckx, 2012). This aversion for 
external regulation have been presented also for Houlihan and others (S. S. Andersen et al., 
2015) (Chapelett & Mabbott, 2008). 
Dominant position; international sport organizations such as FIFA, the IOC, or UEFA 
have shown that ‘they work in networks only based on their own terms and conditions’. They 
strengthen the position of private authority and governance as they do not fundamentally 
challenge the nature of sports. These networks tend to be a closed nature as partnerships are 
based on a logic of ‘exclusive partners’ (Geeraert, Scheerder, & Bruyninckx, 2013). This logic 
handled by sport organizations are against the logic embedded in theories of governance, which 
refers to networks as horizontal forms of organization, lacking strict hierarchy and with shifting 
composition (Spaargaren, 2011). 
For Bruyninckx, new forms of governance that are being developed. One is the 
intervention by means of court cases, as in Bosman (Chapelett & Mabbott, 2008), Meca Medina 
(Geeraert et al., 2013), and more recently, the  case of Tuitert and Kerstholt (Garcia, 2017). 
Other ways are the roles of the European Union stimulating the debate and preparing initiatives 
as Lisbon Treaty (García & Weatherill, 2012). Other actors who can play an important role in 
this complex environment are the World Antidoping Agency (WADA), the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport (CAS) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), who did the first global treaty against doping in sport and the legal cornerstone of 
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the emerging global sports governance. ‘Regardless of the European Union and other attempts at 
the multilateral level, the public regulation of sports in the international arena remains 
surprisingly weak’ (Bruyninckx, 2012). 
An important event in the history of sports governance occurred in 2001, when the 
European Olympic Committees in partnership with the international Automobile Federation, 
held a conference in Brussels called ‘The rules of the game: first international governance in 
sport conference’ (Transparency, 2016b). On that date, the former IOC president Jaques Rogge 
defended the idea of promoting governance in these words ‘Since sport is based on ethics and 
competition on fair play, the governance of sport must comply with the highest standards in 
terms of transparency, democracy and accountability’ (Transparency, 2016b). Other efforts on 
this regard has been done by Australian government to the governance in the Australian Soccer 
Association and Athletics Australia in 2003 and 2004 respectively (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). 
Indeed, was in Australia and later in New Zealand, South Africa and the UK when were 
published guidelines promoting governance in forms of codes or principles to be applied by 
sports organizations. Some examples of this are the set of governing principles for national sport 
organizations (Australia 2002 and 2005); Nine Steps to Effective Governance guide in 2004 
(New Zealand); set of Best Practice Principles of Good Governance in Sport in 2004 (South 
Africa) and Good Governance Guide for National Governing Bodies in the same year (UK) 
(Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). 
Governance in sport has been a scandal driven issue. The response of the sport 
organizations can be summarized in these attitudes. First, in the face of any attempt of regulation, 
they have promised to set-up stronger systems of self-governance sending a message of ‘we 
know your concerns, but do not intervene in our business, we can and will take care of this 
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ourselves’ (Misener, 2012). Second, legitimate governance. ‘They have sought to network with 
multilateral institutions to create legitimacy and networked authority’. Alliances between the 
IOC with UN on such issues as development (UNDP), culture and education (UNESCO) and the 
environment (UNEP) are examples of this (Misener, 2012). Third, is the aversion to external 
rules or regulations. The IOC supported the Lisbon Treaty, but stressed that the EU should 
‘support and not regulate sport’. They insist on appealing of the autonomous nature of sport. For 
them, ‘public support are welcomed if it is in forms of financial means, infrastructure and 
security, but regulation should be avoided’ (Misener, 2012).  
As a criticism on sports governance overall, and to show that corruption in sport 
governance is systematic, Bruyninckx says that ‘football federations have very close and friendly 
relationships with selected politicians, they select the same people to sports leadership without 
any problem and hardly any questions about the process or the outcomes are asked in public. 
National parliaments are hardly involved (in the bidding process and hosting mega events), 
indeed those who ask critical questions about the opportunity cost of bidding for an event are 
regarded as disloyal or unpatriotic’. Lastly, the lack of authority and hierarchy is evident in the 
current dynamics of governance. This brings conflicts in sports governance, because the relations 
between different bodies are unclear, there are overlapping functions and responsibilities leading 
to multilevel conflicts and endless procedural battles that undermine the legitimacy of the system 
(J. S. Andersen, 2012; Bruyninckx, 2012; Misener, 2012). 
The use of indicators, codes, guidelines, voluntary agreements and bench mark 
approaches appears as ‘innovative policy approaches’ with positive connotation. They are 
considered more flexible and adaptive, and therefore more effective and efficient, fast and 
proactive, participatory and bottom-up or networked (Misener, 2012).  
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Despite this, there are still an integrity problem in sport organizations; for Bruyninckx, 
‘Transparency, accountability and legitimacy at times seem to be as rare as a snowball in the 
desert within the functioning of the largest sport federations’. For this author, ‘the functioning of 
these governance arrangements remains highly problematic therefore’ (Bruyninckx, 2012). 
The Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in the Olympic and Sport Movement 
(PGG here in after) are one of those examples. They became mandatory for International 
Federations and National Olympic Committees after 2008. 
2.5.Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance 
The Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance (PGG) appeared officially in 2008 
as a response of the IOC to tackle mismanagement issues on international sport organizations. 
The attitude of the IOC and other sport organizations have been to keep away any attempt of 
control or external regulation implementing their own codes of good governance. As it is pointed 
out by Bruyninkx, they are sending a double message: ‘we have understood your concern, but do 
not intervene in our business, we can and will take care of this ourselves’ (Bruyninckx, 2012).  
There are several examples of this attitude such as the rules of good governance were 
introduced by the Union Cycliste Internationale in 2004, closely followed by the Dutch NOC and 
the United States Olympic Committee in 2005, the Commonwealth Games Federation in 2006 
and the European Team Sports Association in 2008. Governmental or intergovernmental 
organizations such as UK Sport (in 2004), the European Union (in 2000 and 2007) and the 
Council of Europe (in 2004 and 2005) did likewise (Chapelett, 2016). 
The narrative in the discourse of the IOC’s president, Thomas Bach reflects this attitude: 
‘the IOC has created a template that NOCs can use to build a partnership with governments 
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respecting the autonomy of sport organisations on the one hand and good governance on the 
other hand’ (Bach, 2017). Part of same speech follows: ‘accountability is linked to the autonomy 
of sport. Accountability requires transparency and good governance. Just like we expect politics 
to respect the autonomy of sport to determine the rules governing sports organisations, our 
stakeholders from politics and society rightly expect that the world of sport is also run according 
to the standards of good governance. Only in this way, we as sports organisations can maintain 
our credibility in the eyes of the public. With autonomy comes responsibility for the sports 
movement. This is why responsible autonomy and good governance are two sides of the same 
coin. Responsible autonomy implies rights, but also duties for the sports movement’ (Bach, 
2017).  
As it was mentioned in this section, The Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance 
(PGG) arise as the capacity of self-regulation of sport organizations as long as they respect their 
autonomy. For the IOC, the basis to secure autonomy is good governance; it was confirmed in 
the second seminar on the Autonomy of the Olympic Movement in 2008, when the resolution 
adopted underlined the fact that good governance in sports organizations is the fundamental basis 
to secure Autonomy of Olympic and Sports organizations and to ensure that this Autonomy is 
respected by our stakeholders’ (IOC, 2008b) 
The PGG consist in a set of 7 dimensions and 38 sub-dimensions to be filled by The 
International Federations and The National Olympic Committees. (Chapelett, 2016). Despite the 
broad character of PGG and the multiple interpretations they can be, it was summarized the goals 
derived from the PGG. (Table 1.) 
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Table 1. Goals derived from the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance (PGG) 
Dimension of PGG Goals  
Vision, mission and 
strategy 
(a) To comply his mission, vision and strategy.  
Structures, regulations 
and democratic process 
(b) To be governed under democratic values.  
Highest level of 
competence, integrity 
and ethical standards 
(c) To have high levels of ethical standards. 
Accountability, 
transparency and 
control 
(d) To be transparent in the management of resources.  
Solidarity and 
development 
(e) To be equal in the distribution of his resources. 
Athletes’ involvement, 
participation and care 
(f) To be focused on the development of the athletes. 
Harmonious relations 
with governments while 
preserving autonomy 
(g) To be free of political or commercial interference. 
Source: IOC and self-elaboration. 
In 2012, the IOC made an evaluation to 28 IF using these principles. The result of it was 
the provisional exclusion of wrestling, because IF had no women on its decision-making bodies 
with no athletes’ commission and failed to follow the concepts of good governance, strongly 
criticized by Chapelett because their lack of accuracy and broad character (Chapelett, 2016). 
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The European Union has been a key actor in the field of sports governance, they 
introduced the adoption of article 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(Lisbon Treaty) (Chapelett, 2016) and funded projects such as Action for Good Governance in 
Sport and Good Governance in Grassroots Sport in order to assess governance in IF and in 
Grassroots sports respectively (Geeraert, 2015). 
All these approaches lay down in the ideal of Western democracy, presented by 
Cornforth and cited by (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007) which are based in open elections on the basis 
of one person one vote; pluralism. The other idea is that elected representatives will represent 
interests other than their own; accountability to the electorate and separation of elected 
representatives, the people who the make policy rather than the executive who implement the 
policy. 
2.6. Limitations of Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in Sport 
The PGG are one example of guideline for improve governance in sport organizations. 
Other organizations across the Olympic Movement have developed their own codes and tools 
assess sport governance. There are very few examples of tools for measuring sports organization 
governance. Exceptions include, for instance, UK Sports 11 ‘Governance Requirements’, the 
Australian Sports Commission’s 20 Mandatory Sports Governance Principles, the 63 Basic 
Indicators for Better Governance in International Sport (BIBGIS), the Sports Governance 
Observer for IF and NF (SGO), and the First Review of IF Governance run by ASOIF 
Governance Task force in April 2017’. (Chapelett, 2016) It will be shown the limitations of the 
specific PGG in the Olympic and Sport Movement. 
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Firstly, agency problem. The nature of the sport organizations is one of the reasons why 
the reforms in governance are slow and difficult to implement. Those reforms have to be 
approved by a general meeting of the organization in question, – that is, by the very people who 
will be the most affected by them. Moreover, there are many agent-principal problems; as 
Thibault notes: ‘The same individuals are involved in both the management and control of 
decision making’ (Chapelett, 2016).  
Secondly, Commercial interest of International sport Federations. Despite some authors 
considering sport organizations non-profit organizations and autonomous, Bruynikx argues the 
contrary, for him, the international sport organizations are driven by economic interests ‘is 
obvious that commercial interests are a major preoccupation of them’ (Bruyninckx, 2012); and 
‘it is absurd to accept the notion that they (sport organizations) are non-governmental 
organizations’. For him, ‘the organization of sports is mostly different from political-multilevel 
organization, thus making the matching of normative framework and government arrangements 
rather difficult’.  
On one side, is the ‘unspecified’ and broad concept of ‘good’ governance (Chapelett, 2013), 
and on the other side, is the huge range of sport organizations under the Olympic System, which 
are diverse in size and resources, indeed in the same country. When the indicators were 
presented, there were no chance for NOC’s of IF’s to participate in building process, the IOC 
expected that all members under the rule of Olympic Charter understand and follow the rules as 
they promote (S. S. Andersen et al., 2015).  
When the PGG became mandatory for NOC’s and IF’s, they were used as a tool to evaluate 
good governance in IF, the Wrestling’s IF was provisionally banned by IOC for had no women 
on its decision-making bodies and no athletes’ commission (Chapelett, 2016). As a consequence 
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of this kind of model, board members and managers felt and thought that resources would be 
given based on their answers, so they will do anything to comply standards without changing 
behaviors or mismanagement of practices. 
2.7.Elite sport context 
 The former called amateur sport is now recognized as elite sport. It encompasses the 
national and international structures involved to deliver excellence in sport through high levels of 
human performance. Except for the United States, there is a global trend of governments to 
invest public funds in this kind of sport. 
A report presented by The Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region of the People's Republic of China in 2005 defines it, ‘Elite sport is what others would 
refer to as high‐performance sports. Elite sports, or high-performance sports, are sports 
engaged in by elite athletes who achieve, or aspire to achieve, or have been identified as having 
the potential to achieve, excellence in world class competitions such as the Olympic Games and 
World Championships’ (Legislative Council, 2015) 
According to the Colombian law (Coldeportes, 2004), there are no definition of elite 
sport there, but there are four branches of sport -associated to elite sport- (associated, 
competitive, high performance, and amateur) that can be grouped under the elite sport definition.  
Certainly, Associated Sport; is developed by a set of private sport organizations, 
hierarchically organized to develop competitive programs in the National, Departmental and 
Municipal level. Competitive Sport; is a set of events, competitions and tournaments whose 
primary goal is to reach a high technical level. It belongs to Associated Sport organizations’ 
structure. High Performance Sport; it has its place in higher development levels, comprehends 
37 
 
processes oriented towards high performance through scientific and technological advantages. 
Also, Amateur Sport; which do not admit payment or compensation in favor of players, different 
to the expenses caused during the exercise of the sport activity. As is noticed, there are common 
elements under the elite sport definition: Organizations hierarchically set high-performance 
oriented competitions and the amateur ideal is still alive in this law. It is necessary to clarify also, 
that this law was promulgated in 1995 and there is a project in congress to update it.  
Elite sport takes part under a network of organizations called the Olympic System. It is 
defined by Chapelett and Kubler-Mabbott as ‘a vast network that encompasses a broad range of 
partners: public, private, and associative, and national, international and transnational. No 
single partner really dominates world sport (…) their reason to be revolves around the 
organization of competitions at all levels, of which the most prestigious has been the modern 
Olympic Games, first held in 1896’ (Chappelet & Kübler, 2008). 
Briefing the Olympic System, they explain that there are five established actors as the 
IOC, The Olympic Games Organizing Committee (OCOG), The International Federations (IF’s), 
The National Olympic Committees (NOC’s), The Association of National Olympic Committees, 
ANOC; continental associations (as; The Association of National Olympic Committees of 
Africa, ANOCA; The Pan American Sports Organization, PASO; The Olympic Council of Asia, 
OCA; The European Olympic Committees and the Oceania National Olympic Committees, 
ONOC), and The National Federations (NF’s). There are three regulators of the system as The 
Court of Arbitration of Sport (T/CAS), The World Anti/doping Agency (WADA), and The IOC 
Ethics Commission. And there are four new actors that follow; the governments, global sponsors, 
national sponsors and professional teams or athletes and American professional team leagues. In 
this regard they say ‘the importance that elite sport has taken on today, and particularly on an 
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economic and social level, tends to favor the emergence of other representative structures 
(groups of athletes, athletes’ unions, owners of teams or tournaments) and to threaten this 
unified determination on the part of the sports sector’ (Chapelett & Mabbott, 2008) 
The five established and main actors operate under the non-profit organizations umbrella. 
Those organizations have unique characteristics as it will be shown later, more in the field of 
sport, where it had (remove) created a governance framework different to corporate governance. 
As other non-profit organizations, its governance involved a greater number of stakeholders, 
pressures and challenges in their decision-making structures and processes (Hoye & Cuskelly, 
2007). 
2.8. Characteristics, Pressures and Challenges for Elite Sports Organizations 
Elite sport organizations are managed under the legal figure of non-profit organizations. 
Differences in management, values, beliefs and the core of the business in the elite sport are 
presented in this section.  
There are differences among nonprofit organizations and profit-oriented firms presented 
by Peter Drucker cited by (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007): ‘organizational mission; the outcomes of 
the organization; strategies to market their services and raise funds; the need to attract, develop 
and manage volunteers; managing a diversity of constituent groups; fund raising and fund 
development; problems with individual burnout; and importantly, the very different role that the 
board plays in the nonprofit institution’. 
Authors such as Alexander and Weiner cited by Hoyle & Cuskelly, argue that nonprofit 
organizations may not be able to adopt corporate governance models because strong pressures to 
adhere traditional values of voluntarism, constituent representation and stewardship.  
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Other scholars cited by Hoyle & Cuskelly, defined non-profit organizations as ‘member-
benefit organizations’ that are created and maintained by the members who consume the services 
provided by the organization. Indeed, sport organizations operate under the common 
understanding of the volunteer character of the members at the top ‘the institutionalized nature of 
the governance structures of nonprofit sport organizations, where there is universal acceptance of 
the volunteer board at the top of the hierarchy of authority’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).  
Monopolistic business. The Olympic System is focused in the organization of 
competitions at all levels, being the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup, the most known. 
As says Jens Andersen, ‘this has been to the great advantage of sports organisations, who, for 
their part, are in a market with very little competition. Within each sport they are de facto 
monopolies’ (J. S. Andersen, 2012) 
The nature of management in non-profit organizations in society are shared by non-profit 
sport organizations, and it has implications for his governance: First; difficulties to monitor 
performance. They are not driven solely by financial motives, and they may have imprecise 
objectives; they have many stakeholders including their members, users, government, sponsors, 
volunteers and staff; complex organizational structures, especially if they have adopted a 
federated or representative model to facilitate the involvement of a wide range of diverse 
stakeholders; they rely heavily in the input of volunteers for governance roles and delivery’s 
services; the relationship between the board and paid staff is potentially difficult if there remains 
uncertainty over who is in control of the organization and; these organizations are created on the 
basis of a set of values or beliefs about the service or opportunities the organization provides. 
Conflict over direction or priorities can arise through differing interpretations of these values, 
making it difficult to govern (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). 
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There are two types of non-profit voluntary sport organizations (VSO). The traditional, 
and the contemporary. The first have strong collective identities, operate as cooperatives and 
consider professionalism and external assistance from government as a treat. The second, more 
flexible and adaptable to changes, are business like and receptive to external assistance (Hoye & 
Cuskelly, 2007). 
The challenges within the governance in VSO’s described by Cuskelly are low 
participation, recruitment, ageing of board members and increased bureaucracy. ‘Decreased 
number of volunteers in the last 5 years; recruitment difficulties in national governing bodies 
(NGB); increasingly ageing volunteer force, especially for core administrative and governance 
roles; volunteers are devoting more time in response to increased bureaucracy and pressure to 
implement changes imposed by sport NGB and legislation’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). 
While sport has received more attention for his social boundaries and for his role as 
national pride and political identity mean, the VSO have strengthened their ties with 
governments. ‘In exchange for government funding, National Governing Bodies are responsible 
for the delivering of both high-performance programs for elite athletes and sport development 
initiatives designed to increase involvement in regular organized sport. The activities of 
nonprofit sport organizations are becoming increasingly tied to the aims of governance 
policies’(Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007) Governance in these organizations are indirectly influenced 
and shaped by governments, whose request increasing levels of accountability under the 
increased funding carries (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). 
In Colombia, the NOC remains separated from government, but the state exert strong 
influence by funding the NOC and the National Federations direct and indirectly. 
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2.9. The role of State  
The role of the state in the governance of the VSO have been broadly covered in the 
literature review. One of the best partners of elite sport organizations is government, and VSO 
know that, adapting their governance structures to comply their requirements and obtaining 
public funding in exchange. ‘Nonprofit organizations have subsequently entered into contractual 
arrangements to deliver more and more services on behalf of government. The relationship 
between government and the nonprofit sector generally has shifted ‘towards notions of social 
contract, mutual obligation and partnerships between individuals, communities and the state’ 
(Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007) Nevertheless, funding is not the only way to cooperation between 
them, ‘the funding arrangements take many forms: grants, free for service contracts or 
government loans and sport organizations may also receive other types of support such as access 
to facilities or expertise, or even direct organizational support’(Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). 
Governments have taken part in that monopoly as an active partner, playing a critical role 
in the development of the elite sport system. His main function as sponsor of elite sport events 
and delivering high performance national athletes have shaped different forms of relationships 
such cooperative, complementary, co-optive or confrontational (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). 
Despite the nature of VSO as non-profit organizations, they have increased their power 
and influence at the level of global corporations because governments and private companies 
have been interested in sponsor elite athletes and events like The World Championships, The 
FIFA World Cup and The Olympics (Bruyninckx, 2012). 
Elite sport organizations have pressures from multiple stakeholders involved. As is 
shown by Cuskelly, each of those stakeholders have interest in the governance of the VSO. The 
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power and characteristic of influencing of each stakeholder can chance according to the nature 
and the power of the National Governing Body. (Figure 1)  
Figure 1. Stakeholders for NGBs 
 
Source: Adapted from (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). 
In terms of governance and management, VSO have committed with four main goals. 
Firstly, run programs for elite sport athletes, trying to deliver excellence in a global sport context, 
which is more competitive these days. Secondly, encourage governments to host and share the 
costs of all kinds of sporting events. Thirdly, govern sport in a specific territory, according to 
technical standards, developing coaches’ and referees’ capacities (e.g. coach training, 
accreditation and registration and member registration). And lastly, complying governance 
standards according to one or more sponsors’ demands (e.g. greater accountability for funds 
received, social inclusion, equal access, child protection) (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). 
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Despite characteristics, pressures and challenges of governance in VSO, ‘there was 
sufficient evidence to suggest that at least some organizations are well placed to cope with these 
increasing pressures and that the capability of individual organizations to cope with these 
pressures should be taken into consideration’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). 
2.10.  Colombian Context 
Colombia has an estimated population of 47,698,524 and the ethnic groups are mestizo and 
white 84.2%, Afro-Colombian (includes mulatto, raizal, and palenquero) 10.4% among others 
(Agency, 2017). Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador share the same flag colors because until 
1831 these three countries were one. The country included the territories of present-day Panama, 
northern Peru, western Guyana and northwest Brazil. The Great Colombia (Gran Colombia) was 
a failed state, they only existed from 1819 to 1831.  
For journalists, scholars, and historians, Colombian society is still regretting Spanish 
occupation. Colombian people think they were stolen with blood and death. The average 
Colombian is someone with strong capacity to overcome hard situations, but always lack a little 
to achieve what they want. Colombia is a land of contradictions. Their citizens assessed 
themselves as one of the happiest in the world (Agencia EFE, 2018), but they live in an 
inequality and violent environment. The Country’s history has been surrounded by tragedies and 
violence in a cycle that seems to have no end. Also, it looks like the Independence Wars were the 
arena in which elites foraged for the constituents of new states and nations (Brown, 2006).  
In this country, income inequality is among the worst in the world, and more than a third of 
the population lives below the poverty line. Colombia is the largest source of Latin American 
refugees in Latin America, nearly 400,000 of whom live primarily in Venezuela and Ecuador. 
Forced displacement remains prevalent because of violence among guerrillas, paramilitary 
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groups, and Colombian security forces. As of February 2017, an estimated 7.4 million people 
have been internally displaced since 1985, the highest amount in the world. These estimates may 
undercount actual numbers because not all internally displaced people are registered. 
Historically, Colombia also has one of the world's highest levels of forced disappearances. 
About 30,000 cases have been recorded over the last four decades - although the number is likely 
to be much higher - including human rights activists, trade unionists, Afro-Colombians, 
indigenous people, and farmers in rural conflict zones. More than 31,000 former paramilitaries 
demobilized by the end of 2006 and the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia as a formal 
organization ceased to operate. In the wake of the paramilitary demobilization, organized 
criminal groups arose, whose members include some former paramilitaries. After four years of 
formal peace negotiations, the Colombian Government signed a revised final peace accordance 
with the FARC in October 2016. The agreement was taken to a referendum and voters in 
Colombia rejected it in a result with 52% voting against it (BBC News, 2016). Even with this 
agreement, with voters were divided, and with some politicians against it. Finally, the agreement 
was ratified by the Colombian Congress with a bitter feeling that half Country supported the 
peace and the other did not. Despite this, the risk of displacement remains as other rebel groups 
fill the void left by the FARC (Agency, 2017). 
There are reasons to believe that the conflict in Colombia is already over, and the official 
statistics are showing it; according to the Colombian National Institute of Forensic Medicine 
cited by the newspaper, there were 210 homicides in 2016, 92.2% less from 2002, when occurred 
2.713. Also, the report underscores the decrease in deaths in operations of the Armed Forces 
against the armed groups, which went from 594 in 2004 to 117 cases in 2015 and 51 in 2016 (El 
Tiempo, 2017). Despite these statistics, there have been at least 51 human rights activists killed 
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in 2017. Nobody knows exactly how many people have been killed or disappeared this year. 
Official source speak 52 homicides from January to June, the United Nations recorded 41 until 
May. "Beyond the numbers, the issue is that there is targeted violence and it has become sharper 
in some areas with the FARC leaving," says Carlos Guevara from We Are Defenders, who 
estimates 51 homicides in the last six months (Palomino, 2017). 
2.11. Colombian Sports Sector Context 
The sports sector context shares some issues identified in VSO world-wide with others as a 
consequence of external environment. Several diagnoses have shown a problematic situation 
within the sport in Colombia, in terms of coordination, articulation, achievement, and 
measurement of objectives. There are some characteristics identified in elite sport system related 
to previous diagnoses (Coldeportes, 2013). 
• Disarticulation between the actors, subsystems and subsectors that make up the National 
Sports System (NSS).  
• To ignore recreation, community, physical activity and dance organizations associated 
with sport and try to reduce or associated with old structures of associated sport (Clubs, 
Leagues, Federations).  
• Lack of clarity about the roles and relationships between NSS actors. 
• Low capacity for planning and addressing the public and private actors that make up the 
NSS. 
• Lack of visibility of the sector's impact in National development goals. 
• Weak capacity to get resources (funding) of amateur sport, especially new manifestations 
of sport, or less popular sports. 
• High dependency of public funds.  
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• Weak sustainability of sectoral public policies subject to lack of planning in the 
management of resources. 
• Excessive centralism in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of sectoral 
policies, programs and projects 
A master thesis about autonomy in sport organizations in Colombia showed that there is a 
systemic problem in elite sport context in Colombia; by the elite sport side, there is a lack of 
capabilities and by the state’s side, a control’s deficiency; ‘most of sports managers do not have 
enough time or knowledge to run the organizations, and Coldeportes does not have enough 
administrative capacity to exert control as the lead agency of sport in Colombia’ (Villareal, 
2017). 
2.12. National Sport System 
According to the National Sports Law (Coldeportes, 2004), the sport is a constitutional right 
and the state must support, promote, foster and coordinate all sporting activity in Colombia. The 
government set up a system to assure the universal access to sport through The National System 
of Sport (NSS). Literally, the NSS is the set of agencies, articulated among themselves, to 
facilitate communities’ free access to sport, recreation, leisure and physical education. 
The NSS is constituted by two branches, one public and other private. And these branches 
have three levels according to the administrative and political division in Colombia; so, in this 
case, it is existing a National, Departmental, and Municipal/Private level and other National, 
Departmental, and Municipal/Public level. This system (NSS) has been criticized among years 
due to centralism, bureaucracy, mismanagement in sports events, corruption in sports 
infrastructure projects, sports managers without experience of no background related, and high 
political interference in sport organizations (Coldeportes, 2013).  
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The NSS was created in 1995 according to the demands of the context for that time, now, 
more than twenty years after that, other subsystems such as physical education, physical activity 
and sports for all are requesting their own space, far from hierarchically and traditional old 
structures. The need of updating the law have been pointed also by Villareal ‘from a legal 
standpoint all the respondent stated the need to update the 1995 sports law because it is often 
unclear due to legal loopholes and problems concerning its interpretation arise constantly’ 
(Villareal, 2017). 
The NSS has been criticized by their slowness, passivity and low operative capacity. It seems 
to be well planned and structured, but it does not work in practice. More than twenty years of 
diagnoses and evaluations have shown the complexity in the management of the system. 
2.13. The National Sports Plan 
Despite the above, there is a National Sports Plan (Coldeportes, 2013) where Coldeportes 
was a steering actor leaded before 2009. This was the first long term-effort to lead a Public 
Policy for Sport in Colombia. The Ten-Year Plan for Sport, Recreation, Physical Education and 
Physical Activity for Human Development, Coexistence and Peace 2009-2019 is considered the 
document where the Public Policy of Sport in Colombia is extensively explained. 
The Ten-Year Plan mentions several things such as the superior purposes, the human 
development, coexistence and peace. The vision of this plan is to show in 2019, public indicators 
in terms of coexistence, public health and achievements in high performance sport. In Colombia 
they call it ‘continental sports power’ (Coldeportes, 2013). This is positive for Elite sport system 
in Colombia because they receive public funding to achieve this. The NOC and the NF benefit 
from this policy. There is vast evidence showing a direct relationship between public funding 
and success in international sport (Truyens, De Bosscher, Heyndels, & Westerbeek, 2014). 
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2.14. Previous research 
In the literature review about governance in elite sport organizations, there are numerous 
studies assessing governance in sport (Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 2013; Geeraert, 
2016; Geeraert, Mrkonjic, & Chappelet, 2015; Geeraert et al., 2013). 
The most comprehensive review about this topic was done by the project Sports 
Governance Observer, a benchmarking tool to strengthen transparency and democracy sport 
funded by The European Union (Play the Game, 2015). They published state of art of sports 
governance literature by categories. Governments (Council of Europe 2004, 2005, 2007, 2012; 
European Union 2000, 2007, 2011); non-government organizations (Transparency International, 
2010, 2011; Play the Game 2011, One World Trust 2007, 2008); transnational corporations 
(Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2012); scholars (Katwala, 2000; Chaker, 2004;  Henry and Lee, 2004; 
Burger and al., 2005; Chappelet and Kübler‐Mabott, 2008; Taylor and O’Sullivan, 2009; De 
Zwart and Gilligan, 2009; Mowbray, 2012); European sports associations (European Olympic 
Committees and Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile, 2001; Union Cycliste Internationale, 
2004; Commonwealth Games Federation, 2006; International Olympic Committee, 2008; 
European Team Sports Association, 2008; Union of European Football Associations, 2009, 
2012) and national sport associations (Sport and Recreation South Africa, 2004; UK Sport, 2004; 
Dutch NOC*NSF, 2005; United States Olympic Committee, 2005; Sport New Zealand, 2006; 
Wales Sports Council, 2006; Sport and Recreation Alliance (UK), 201; Sport England, 2011; 
Australian Sports Commission, 2012) have provided a set of principles of good governance in 
sport. 
Five thesis (Alvarado, 2017; Ayouni & Kim, 2017; Octaria, 2015; Said, 2015; Shahbaz, 
2015) on good governance in sport and autonomy have explored governance in sport using the 
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Basic Indicators for Better Governance in Sport (BIBGIS) (Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 
2013).  
In Latin American context, there was done a research about manager’s perceptions and 
acceptance of the Basic Indicators of Better Governance in Guatemala. In overall results, the 
researcher found that although managers acceptation of the indicators was high (average above 
3/5 points), stakeholder representation was under mean (2.44/3). This means, that, for managers, 
there is not important to have diversity in governance. That could happen because they are not 
agreed with his participation. That is not clarified at the study. Also, there is mentioned that is 
necessary to work in the organizational culture, showing that, to have indicators or codes about 
governance is not enough if the culture of the Federate Sport remains the same (Alvarado, 2017). 
Other thesis on this topic is the assessment of good governance practices in the 
Indonesian Olympic Committee at 2015. BIBGIS model (Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 
2013) was applied with positive results in four to seven dimensions. Recommendations are under 
the scope of fill some requirements related to have a code of ethics, clear objectives, statutes, 
rules and regulations, but the most important was, the understanding and implementation of 
accountability and transparency (Octaria, 2015).  
Sport Governance in Pakistan were studied by Ibrahim Shahbaz, he assessed governance 
in Pakistan Sports System using BIBGIS model. In most of the dimensions the governances’ 
scores achieved were very low, which means that there were no good governance practices in the 
Pakistan Sports System (Shahbaz, 2015).  
Other thesis assessed and compared Governance in World Taekwondo Federation (WTF) 
before and after 2004. They found that WTF after 2004 succeeded in the betterment of most 
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dimension of governance, doubling the scores in most of seven dimensions of good governance 
except for the solidarity and organization transparency (Ayouni & Kim, 2017).  
Other thesis used The Play the Game assessment tool Action for Good Governance in 
International Sport (AGGIS). The study addressed the good governance practices in the Egyptian 
Archery Federation (EAF). The findings showed the urgent need to implement policy which will 
compel EAF to start embracing good governance principles and indicators to measure the 
governance and performance (Said, 2015). 
There is a thesis about autonomy of sports organizations in Colombia where it was found 
that the national sport system has structural and functional weaknesses, the sports organizations 
have a deficient system of control, insufficient managerial knowledge and/or commitment. 
About sports organizations and law, they suggested that the law does not affect them, however, 
‘there is a clear need update the national sports law, and to establish a clear structure and 
defined roles, regulate processes, create and implement code of ethics, disciplinary code, and 
other mechanisms that ensure compliance with the rules’(Villareal, 2017). Despite sport 
organizations in Colombia have been showing positive results in terms of medals in the Olympic 
Cycle, there is a weakness in adequate management and internal processes as is pointed by 
Villareal (Villareal, 2017). 
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
The methodological considerations for this study will be explained in this chapter. It was 
applied a survey to Athletes and Executives of the Colombian Olympic Committee and the Sport 
Federations in Colombia. The validation of the survey followed five stages. Firstly, the initial 
construction of the survey instrument was based on a review of the literature , mainly the 
questions were taken from the IOC’s working paper Consolidated Minimum Requirements For 
The Implementation Of The Basic Principles Of Good Governance For NOCs (IOC, 2016), the 
Sports Governance Observer (Geeraert, 2015) and the Basic Indicators for Better Governance in 
International Sport (Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 2013). Second, an expert review and 
approval. Third, it was done a double translation to identify misunderstandings. Fourth, a pilot 
test and five, appropriate revisions to the instrument were made after each phase of testing. 
3.2. Sampling 
The sampling method is convenience sampling. The respondents of study are active 
Colombian Athletes involved in elite sport competitions under the called Olympic Cycle 
(Bolivarian, South American, Center and Caribbean, and Pan-American and Olympic Games) by 
the Colombian Olympic Committee (n=60); and Executives of Sport Federations in Colombia or 
the Colombian Olympic Committee (n=30).  
It will be applied a t-test. Dependent variable is the Athletes’ and Executives’ perception 
of the effectiveness of the PGG and the independent variable are the seven dimensions of The 
PGG. 
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3.3. Strategy of Inquiry  
It will be used an online survey to collect data. The technology used to send and 
administrate the data collection will be Google forms. The software used to analyze the 
information will be Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). 
Despite the broad character of PGG (Chapelett, 2016), The IOC established 
‘The consolidated minimum requirements for the implementation of the Basic Principles of 
Good Governance and a self-evaluation tool’ in order to provide specific indicators to National 
Olympic Committees and International Federations (IOC, 2016). 
These Basic Principles of Good Governance refer to seven topics (IOC, 2017a):  
- transparency of rules, management and managers;  
- risk management;  
- efficient internal communication;  
- shared and controlled responsibilities;  
- regular and legitimate elections;  
- the right to appeal all forms of disciplinary measures; and  
- the respect of minorities. 
3.3. Instrument  
 Initial construction of the survey instrument was based on a review of the literature 
(Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 2013; Geeraert, 2015; IOC, 2008a, 2017b). The instrument 
contained two sections. In the first, there is a user characterization. There was asked if they know 
the Basic Universal Principles. If they do, it was asked if they think they are applied in the elite 
sport in Colombia. If they don’t, they can follow the next section. Respondents were asked in a 
Likert’s scale (from Unfulfilled to Highly fulfilled; or no knowledge or opinion), to indicate for 
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twenty-three (23) subdimensions and (7) seven dimensions of Basic Universal Principles of 
Good Governance. Content and face validity were established by submitting the survey to a 
panel of experts and by conducting a pilot test. A pilot test was then performed with a master’s 
students of Dream Together Program at Seoul National University (n=25). Appropriate revisions 
to the instrument were made after each phase of testing. 
 
They were grouped the PGG in categories according to the content of the principles. 
Some have two or three concepts, for example, the first refers to vision, mission and strategy. 
Those were grouped in the category ‘Management’. Other concepts refer to the structures, 
regulations and democratic processes were categorized under ‘Democracy’, and so on. This 
grouping of concepts is explained in the table 2. 
Table 2. Categories and Dimensions of the PGG 
Category  Dimension of PGG Goal 
Management 
 
Vision, mission and strategy 
(a) To comply his mission, 
vision and strategy. 
Democracy 
 Structures, regulations and democratic 
process 
(b) To be governed under 
democratic values. 
Integrity 
 Highest level of competence, integrity 
and ethical standards 
(c) To have high levels of 
ethical standards. 
Transparency 
(control) 
 Accountability, transparency and 
control 
(d) To be transparent in the 
management of resources. 
Solidarity 
 
Solidarity and development 
(e) To be equal in the 
distribution of his resources. 
Athletes  
 Athletes’ involvement, participation 
and care 
(f) To be focused on the 
development of the athletes. 
Autonomy 
 Harmonious relations with 
governments while preserving 
autonomy 
(g) To be free of political or 
commercial interference. 
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Each dimension of the PGG had between four or two sub-categories. They were rated by the 
participants in a scale of six perception items. They reflected the perception of the participants. 
Each perception item was codified like this: Unfulfilled: -2; Slightly fulfilled: -1; Neutral: 0; 
Fulfilled: 1; Highly fulfilled: 2, and Do not have knowledge or opinion: (.). For example, if he or 
she thinks that some principle does not comply, it was assigned a value of -2, or, if he or she 
thinks that the principle completely applies, so it was given a value of 2. I will show each of the 
seven principles analyzing the sample, the mean, the standard deviation (Std Dev) and the 
Minimum and Maximum.  
Figure 2. Scale to analyze the perception of the Athletes and the Executives. 
 
-2 Unfulfilled  -1 Slightly fulfilled       0 Neutral     1 Fulfilled   2 Highly fulfilled  (,)No opinion 
3.4. Data Analysis 
  There was conducted a t-test analysis to estimate the difference between the groups 
relative to the variability of the scores in the groups. There was calculated the standard deviation, 
variance, mean and alpha level (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). 
3.5. Ethical Considerations 
 The participants of this study are adults. It was explained the title and main goal of the 
study and confidentiality was assured. They were informed that their participation was voluntary, 
and the information collected used for academic purposes. They were informed about researcher 
and current tutor basic data as email and telephone numbers. 
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Chapter 4. Results 
4.1. T-test results 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the perception of the PGG between 
athletes and executives from the National Olympic Committee and National Federations. There 
was a significant difference in the scores for each one of the seven principles (p<.0001). These 
results suggest that the perception of the application of PGG in elite sport in Colombia are 
statistically different between athletes and executives. All categories had negative means from 
athlete’s perspective, with the exemption of athletes’ representation (M= 0.028) and autonomy’s 
principles (M= 0.188). The executives have overall better perception of the PGG than athletes, 
all their means were positives. The scores for athletes and executives were consolidated for the 
seven PGG in the Olympic and the Sport Movement in the table 2.  
4.1.1. Knowledge of PGG 
The first question was about the participants’ knowledge have about the PGG. The 
question was if they knew the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in the Olympic 
and Sport Movement. Overall, most of the participants do not know the PGG (N=54, 83%). Into 
the athletes’ group, most of them do not know the PGG (N=50 out of 62). While into the 
executives’ group, is the opposite, most of them know the PGG (N=25 out of 29). The results are 
shown in table 4. The differences between them were significant. 
4.1.2 Application of PGG  
The participants who knew the PGG (37%); were asked if they think the PGG overall apply 
to elite sport in Colombia. There were three choices. Apply, do not apply or partially apply. Only 
18 (48%) persons replied this question, for them, those principles apply; other 19 participants did 
not reply. (Table 3). 
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Table 3. Knowledge and Application of PGG between athletes and executives. 
Participants 
Knowledge Implementation 
Yes No Yes No 
Athletes 12 (13%) 50 (55%) 6 (16%) 0 
Executives 25 (28%) 4 (4%) 12 (32%) 0 
Total 37 (41%) 54 (59%) 18 (48%) 0 
P-values <0.0001* 
4.1.3. Perceptions of PGG 
The athletes’ scores covered from transparency (M= -0.330, SD=1.108) and autonomy 
(M=0.188, SD=1.113). Their perception of the application of PGG in elite sport are between 
neutral and lightly negative. The lowest scored principle (transparency) is related to 
accountability, control, management of resources, and checks and balances. On the other side, 
the highest scored principle (autonomy) is related to have harmonious relations with government 
and be free of political or commercial interference. 
Table 4. Consolidated scores for athletes and executives. 
Principle Group 
N Mean 
Std 
Dev Diff t value* 
Management 
Athletes 52 -0.013 1.235 
-1.266 -4.71 
Executives 29 1.253 1.007 
Democracy 
Athletes 49 -0.036 1.118 
-1.424 -5.96 
Executives 29 1.388 0.823 
Integrity 
Athletes 34 -0.066 1.003 
-1.361 -5.5 
Executives 28 1.295 0.928 
Transparency 
Athletes 37 -0.330 1.108 
-1.682 -5.55 
Executives 26 1.239 1.097 
Solidarity Athletes 46 -0.196 1.076 
-1.244 -6.63  
Executives 24 1.486 0.857 
Athletes Athletes 36 0.028 1.085 
-1.049 -3.84  
Executives 26 1.077 1.025 
Autonomy Athletes 40 0.188 1.113 
-1.244 -4.72 
  Executives 29 1.431 1.033 
*Significant differences in all principles 
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The executives’ scores covered from athletes’ representation (M=1.077, SD=1.025) and 
solidarity (M=1.486, SD=0.857). Their perception of the application of PGG in elite sport are all 
positive. The lowest score principle (athletes’ representation) refers to athletes’ involvement, 
participation and care; while the highest scored principle was solidarity, which is related to be 
equal in the distribution of his resources and develop the sport in less privileged regions. 
The executives have better perception of management than athletes. The mean for athletes 
were negative (M=-0.013), so their perception is in between slightly fulfilled (-1) and neutral (0). 
The mean for executives were positive (M=1.253). The standard deviation for athletes 
(SD=1.235) were higher than the executives (SD=1.007). According to that, athletes have more 
distinct perceptions of management in the elite sport in Colombia. The maximum and minimum 
scores were the same for both, some participants of both groups perceive that vision, mission and 
strategy unfulfilled (-2) and others remark that they highly fulfilled (2). 
The executives have a positive perception of democracy (M=1.388) than athletes (M=-
0.036), whose had perceptions somewhat moving to ‘slightly fulfilled’. The executives have 
more favorable perception of democracy than athletes. The mean for athletes were negative (M=-
0.036), so their perception is in between slightly fulfilled (-1) and neutral (0). The mean for 
executives were positive (M=1.388). The standard deviation for athletes (SD=1.118) were higher 
than the executives (SD=0.823).  According to that, athletes have more diverse perceptions of 
democracy in the governance of elite sport in Colombia. The maximum and minimum scores 
were unfulfilled (-2) and highly fulfilled (2) for athletes and for executives, were from slightly 
fulfilled (-1.75) and highly fulfilled (2).  
The mean for athletes in integrity principle was negative (M=-0.0662), so their perception 
is in between slightly fulfilled (-1) and neutral (0). The mean for executives were positive 
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(M=1.295). As in other categories, the executives had a better perception (M=1.295) than 
athletes (M=-0.066), whose had perceptions somewhat moving to ‘slightly fulfilled’. The 
standard deviation for athletes (SD=1.003) were higher than the executives (SD=0.928). The 
maximum and minimum scores were unfulfilled (-2) and highly fulfilled (2) for athletes and for 
executives were from slightly fulfilled (-1.5) and highly fulfilled (2). 
The executives have better perception of transparency than athletes. The mean for athletes 
were negative (M=-0.330), so their perception is in between slightly fulfilled (-1) and neutral (0). 
The mean for executives were positive (M=1.239). The standard deviation for athletes 
(SD=1.108) were higher than the executives (SD=1.097). The maximum and minimum scores 
were the same for both, from the minimum possible (-2) score and the maximum score (2).  
The executives have better perception of solidarity than athletes. The mean for athletes was 
negative (M=-0.196), so their perception is in between slightly fulfilled (-1) and neutral (0). The 
mean for executives was positive (M=1.486). The standard deviation for athletes (SD=1.076) 
were slightly higher than the executives (SD=0.857). The maximum and minimum scores were 
the same for both, from the minimum possible score and the maximum score.  
The second higher mean in data analysis for athletes (M=0.028) were found in Athlete’s 
representation. By contrast, the lowest mean (M=1.077) in executive’s data were for Athlete’s 
representation. In despite of this, the perception is still better in executives than in athletes. Just 
in Autonomy and Athletes representation, means were positive for athletes. The standard 
deviation for athletes was (SD=1.085) and for executives was (SD=1.025). The maximum and 
minimum scores were the same for both. 
The executives have better perception of autonomy than athletes. The mean for athletes were 
positive (M=0.188). This means that the athletes perceive that the elite sport system in Colombia 
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is free of political and commercial influence. The mean for executives were also positive 
(M=1.253). The executives have more positive perception of autonomy than athletes. The 
standard deviation for athletes (SD=1.113) were higher than the executives (SD=1.033). The 
maximum and minimum scores were for athletes, from (-2) to (2). For executives, scores range 
was from -1.5 to 2. 
In suggestions at the end of the questionnaire, two executives wrote comments as well. First, 
said that the ‘sport level, sets the social, economic and political development of a country’. And 
the second commented ‘I propone to you to lead an evaluation project of the National 
Federations using one of the current tools.’ Curiously, more than ten athletes commented in this 
section. Some of them said the necessity of social security system for athletes after retirement, 
because when they retired of sport, at certain age, they do not have professional experience, 
making more complex their adaptation to labour market. Others suggested that administrators 
and coaches should be assessed according to their position and tasks, not by athlete’s sport 
success. Also commented that there are a lot of information are not shared with athletes, even 
other stakeholders; and no equity in the distribution of resources. Latest comments pointed out 
the necessity to increase public and athlete awareness in these topics, especially, athletes’ 
involvement. 
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Chapter 5. Discussion 
 
There is very little published in academic journals about athletes' perception and 
governance in elite sport. Despite the evolution of the Olympic Movement is going towards 
‘ensure the respect for the athletes who are at the heart of the Olympic Games’ (IOC, 2014; 
MacAloon, 2016), the voice of the athletes tends to be sidelined. Interviews with scholars such as 
Borja Garcia and Barrie Houlihan confirmed this appreciation, even more, in a conversation with 
professor Jean Loupe Chapelett he said, ‘the view of athletes is not well taken into account.’  
A recent study about ‘stakeholder perspectives of the governance of schoolboy football in 
Ireland’ showed an ‘ineffective stakeholder management (poor communication practices, 
perceptions of inaccurate disclosures, perceived lack of inclusion in decision-making, 
perceptions of organizational injustice, confusion over role clarity and responsibilities)’ 
(Finnegan, McArdle, Littlewood, & Richardson, 2018). 
One of the biggest studies with athletes and governance was developed by the players' 
union for professional footballers (FIFPro) in Eastern Europe. Researchers found issues related 
to delays on payments, violence, bullying and harassment, match-fixing and discrimination 
(FIFPro, 2012). After the publication of this report, FIFA made significant changes in the 
governance of football (FIFA, 2016). Those changes were possible due to the strong pressure 
footballers did on FIFA, the popularity of football, the crisis raised on FIFA-Gate scandal in 
2015 and the economic power of some professional football players whose can afford lawyers 
researchers and managers. The situation in other sports could be the same, even worst, were 
decisions made by clubs or NOC’s were challenged by CAS to protect contractual or legal rights 
and the principle of good faith (Rigozzi, 2010). 
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The more renowned studies on governance in sport organizations have been done by the 
Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF, 2018) and Play the Game 
(Play the Game, 2015). NOCs do self-assessment on governance but not as a product of 
academic initiative, and their results remain private.  
The ASOIF and Play the Games studies been self-assessed and voluntary studies, arising 
the agency problem described by Hoye (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). Which means that results can 
be biased by officials (agents) who want to show an image about the governance, while the 
government or the IOC (shareholders) want to discover fails on it. Agency theory has been the 
predominant theoretical approach to the study of corporate governance (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). 
The ASOIF questionnaire consists in 50 measurable indicators divided into five sections: 
Transparency, Integrity, Democracy, Development and Control Mechanisms. IFs were asked to 
determine a score for each question on a scale from 0 to 4 (0 – Not fulfilled at all; 1 – Partially 
fulfille; 2 – Fulfille; 3 – Well-fulfilled according to published rules/procedures; 4 – Totally 
fulfilled in a state-of-the-art way) according to defined criteria, and to provide explanatory 
evidence, such as a hyperlink to a relevant page on their website. According to the report, ‘there 
are improvement in the governance of IF individually and collectively. However, a great deal of 
work remains to be done and there are very large differences between the best performing IFs 
and the weakest’ (ASOIF, 2018). 
AGIS project (Action for Good Governance in International Sports Organizations) 
‘identified serious governance deficiencies in international sport. It shows that most international 
sports federations fail to comply with basic standards for democracy, transparency and 
accountability.’ Play the Game, the NGO responsible of the study, are running out a 
benchmarking tool that assesses the level of governance in national sports federations. It expects 
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a report at the end of 2018 (Play the Game, 2015). Unfortunately, none of those studies, consider 
the opinion or athletes’ perception.  
Play the Game project, the dimensions of good governance are transparency, democratic 
processes, internal accountability and control and societal responsibility. Those dimensions are 
set by forty-six principles and two hundred seventy-four (274) indicators. The indicators were 
divided in three categories, such as basic indicators (minimum standard of good governance); 
advanced indicators (costlier and, thus, more demanding to implement) and state of the art 
indicators (highest standards of good governance).  
5.1. Comparison between athletes and executives 
 
Comparison between groups, showed significant differences in the seven PGG (p<.0001). 
The perception about the application of those principles for athletes are in between (-1 slightily 
fulfilled) and (0 neutral). For executives were in between (0 neutral) and (1 fulfilled). These 
results suggest that the perception of compliance of PGG in elite sport in Colombia are 
statistically different between athletes and executives, they have overall better perception than 
the athletes, however both are close to have a neutral perception. All scores in executives were 
positives, while 5 up to 7 were negative in athletes.  
These findings open a discussion regarding the problems raised with Top-to down 
approach proposed traditionally by the IOC, the effectiveness of the implementation policies and 
the management of stakeholders by the NOC. So, one question arised from this could be what 
implementation strategy is appropriate in the specific contexts of NFs? Those problems are 
discussed later. 
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5.1.2. Athlete´s perspective 
 
From athlete’s perspective, with the exemption of athletes’ representation and 
autonomy’s principles, other principles had negative means, from Transparency to Management. 
A study conducted within French Rugby Union showed agreement and conflict between the 
actors. Lack of engagement from these stakeholders (athletes) may result in a limited impact of 
sport policy. Researchers suggest that a “one size fits all” approach should enable a degree of 
regional freedom for sport governing bodies that include organizational membership (Viollet, 
Minikin, Scelles, & Ferrand, 2016). 
Other survey study involving 261 elite athletes from 51 different countries and four 
international sports federations, conducted by Swedish scholars focusing on elite athletes’ 
perceptions of anti-doping, showed that the athletes had concerns about the legitimacy of the 
way the rules and principles are enforced in practice, specifically with regard to matters of 
privacy, lack of efficiency and equal conditions as well as athletes’ involvement in the anti-
doping work (Efverström, Ahmadi, Hoff, & Bäckström, 2016). 
Athletes are not involved with the administration, even with the governance of sport; 
results showed that just 13% know the PGG, and 6 of them think those comply, others did not 
reply. Further studies could find out how many athletes are involved now in the administration of 
sport, or why other athletes do not want to be involved with it. A Canadian scholar suggest that a 
real democratization of sport should be possible, if the sport organizations were controlled by the 
athletes (Donnelly, 2015).  
National Federations are generally composed by leagues or clubs, not for athletes. In 
Colombia, NF are composed by leagues, which are associations of clubs. Chapelett suggests a 
new form of sport organization to improve the autonomy and governance at international sport 
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level with the creation of cooperatives of athletes in a given sport. This would give more voice to 
the athletes (one athlete=one vote) which would help run not-for-profit activities along 
commercial activities within the framework of a social and solidarity-based economy (Chapelett, 
2016). This proposal could bring a new vision of sport organization and would open a new field 
of research in sport management area, with cooperatives as a new form of sport organization. 
The lowest scored principle (transparency) is related to accountability, control, management 
of resources, and checks and balances. This principle is probably the most sensitive item because 
it relates directly with the administration of resources. Transparency is an ideal proposed by the 
IOC. Reporting transparency is a regular practice in high developed democracies, but there is not 
the same in Colombian context. This country has rules and public agencies in charge of oversight 
the transparency in public organizations. The COC is legally a private organization. Despite the 
COC uses public funding, they are not required to comply those regulations, and they do not do 
it. Each principle is critical for the governance of the system, but from IOC’s perspective, 
transparency is critical.  
Agenda 2020 is a group of IOC’s 40 recommendations to implement within the Olympic 
Movement. They shape of what the future of the Olympic Movement will look like. 
Recommendation 27 says: "Comply with basic principles of good governance". It details that all 
organizations belonging to the Olympic Movement to accept and comply with the Basic 
Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement (“PGG”). The 
IOC suggests periodical updates of PGG and to self-valuate it, 'emphasizing the necessity for 
transparency, integrity and opposition to any form of corruption'. There is a consolidated list 
with practical implementation and minimum requirements/ expectations for NOCs. There are 
three issues here. First, language barriers. The document in English just can be read for few 
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people inside the COC. Second, the minimum requirements are vague and easily manipulated, 
even more when self-evaluation is proposed. Organizations can show written vision, mission and 
codes for preventing corruption, even they can reach their goals; but, how are they doing that? 
What about the practices behind those outputs? Having rules in place or documents do not 
guarantee transparence in processes, democracies in Latin America are the same proof of it. 
Minikin (Minikin, 2015) showed that it is relatively easy for individuals to manipulate the 
established rules in order to obtain and retain power. Third, even if a self-evaluation is proposed, 
it requires a staff to do that, that is, resources for it. Despite the elite sport in Colombia is highly 
funded, resources to reach international sport success and demands of elite athletes are 
increasing, and resources from government (main source) are considered scarce.  
Other principles from smallest to highest within athletes’ perspective were solidarity; 
integrity; democracy; management; athletes’ representation; and autonomy. 
Despite each of those principles were explained before each question, there is needed more 
education and therefore, more athlete’s participation in the administration and governance of the 
system. Donnelly points that despite growing public awareness of the problems of governance in 
sport, there has not yet been a grassroots movement attempting to bring about reform – and 
problems such as corruption and match-fixing continue (Donnelly, 2015). He also propones as 
Chapelett does, ‘a democratization of sport in which the players became more involved in the 
organization of their sports’. 
5.1.3. Executives’ perspective 
 
The executives’ scores covered from athletes’ representation and solidarity. Their perception 
of the application of PGG in elite sport were all positive.  
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The lowest score principle, athletes’ representation refers to athletes’ involvement, 
participation and care. This means that the lowest perception of compliance of PGG has direct 
relationship with athletes. This output is completely opposite to the study done by Alvarado 
(Alvarado, 2017), who asked which principles of good governance were most important for 
Guatemalan Sport Managers, and they perceived as important the dimension of democracy but 
not considered important the dimension of Stakeholder Representation (athletes representation). 
Donnelly highlights the necessity of the involvement of athletes in the governance of sport. For 
him, executives and owners of professional teams in sport are largely unaccountable to players 
and fans (Donnelly, 2015) . These results can be interpreted as the executives in Colombia 
recognize the necessity of more participation of athletes in the governance of the elite sport 
system. 
Transparency was the lowest score for athletes and the second lower for executives. This 
suggest the importance of this principle to both groups. Colombia is one of the countries with 
more institutions and rules in place to prevent corruption, (Political Constitution, Anticorruption 
statutes, Penal Code, State Contract Law, Unique Disciplinary Code, etc. Entities specialized in 
controlling, monitoring, disciplining, investigating and prosecuting: Procurator, Comptroller 
(national, departmental and municipal), Public Prosecutor's Office, Accounting, internal control 
offices)  (Editorial, 2018). And the ranking of Colombia in the World’s Corruption Perception 
Index keeps the same scores from 2012 until 2017 in the 96 position (36-37, the lowest score, the 
worst perception) (Transparency, 2017). 
Solidarity was the highest scored principle, which is related to be equal in the distribution of 
his resources and develop the sport in less privileged regions. Executives perceive this principle 
as the most compliant in elite sport system in Colombia. 
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5.1.4. Limitations 
Is easy to identify structures of good governance in organizations but is much more difficult 
to measure corruption alongside the organization. One example of it is the case of FIFA. They 
were ranked in second place when Play the Game did a measurement of governance in 2013. 
Structures and codes can be in place, but it looks like this is not enough to avoid corruption. 
Effective organizations can engage in contradictory activities, which contributes to the paradox 
of organizational effectiveness. This paradox says that ‘Organizational effectiveness is inherently 
paradoxical. To be effective, an organization must possess attributes that are simultaneously 
contradictory, even mutually exclusive’. In fact, Cameron (1986) found that ‘the organizations 
that achieved the highest levels of effectiveness were also those that satisfied the most separate 
constituency group expectations, even when different constituencies held contradictory 
expectations. Highly effective organizations were paradoxical in that they performed in 
contradictory ways to satisfy contradictory expectations’ (Cameron, 1986). 
Nowadays is not possible to understand the complexity under governance in non-profit 
sport organizations, it is necessary, to adopt a ‘multi-paradigm approach to allow the paradoxes, 
ambiguities and tensions involved in governance’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). 
When the PGG became mandatory for NOC’s and IF’s, they were used as a tool to 
evaluate good governance in IF, the Wrestling’s IF was provisionally banned by IOC for had no 
women on its decision-making bodies and no athletes’ commission (Chapelett, 2016). Because of 
this kind of model, board members and managers felt and thought that resources would be given 
based on their answers, so they will do anything to comply standards without changing behaviors 
or mismanagement of practices. 
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The ‘unspecified’ and broad concept of ‘good’ governance (Chapelett, 2013), and the huge 
range of sport organizations under the Olympic System, which are diverse in size and resources, 
indeed in the same country make highly complex and ambiguous the ambition of good 
governance. When the indicators were presented, there were no chance for NOC’s of IF’s to 
participate in building process, the IOC expected that all members under the rule of Olympic 
Charter understand and follow the rules as they promote (S. S. Andersen et al., 2015). Is difficult 
to have Universal Principles for all the NOC, even for all NF when there are huge gaps between 
NOCS and NF. As the study in French Rugby Union, is necessary to move away from a ‘Top-
Down’ approach to strategy development as this may lead to a potential lack of consistency with 
regional contexts. At a National level may occur the same, there are NF plenty of resources and 
others struggling to survive. However, there are some expectations or minimum standards which 
all federations would have, for example, to have a strategic planning, to publish their statutes, to 
stablish term limits. Some IF had presidents or chief executives for 20 or more years in charge, 
this is not good a good example of good governance. 
Since the early 2000’s, innumerable definitions of governance have been put forward; 
Chapelett and Mrkonijc identified more than 35 sets of good governance principles in sport. The 
IOC systematically refers to more than 100 indicators that can be deducted from the PGG, even 
though they have proved difficult to apply (Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 2013). 
As it was commented for Houlihan (Houlihan, 2018), those principles are open to a lot of 
interpretation, we should deep beneath those words. For example, do the votes in the congress 
should be public or secret? What kind of people should conform the executive board? Should 
they represent regionally the country? Or they should be selected for professional profiles and 
specific skills?  
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Other principles such as solidarity could be easily abused by executives for their own benefit. 
That means that cooperation resources, or solidarity founds could be manipulated for executives 
to assure their reelection with regional clubs, as it happens with IF and NF. 
Current studies on governance do represent a snapshot in time, as it recognizes ASOIF study, 
and ‘an analysis of documents, procedures and structures does not take account of behavior and 
organizational culture.’ 
5.1.5. Proposals 
Good governance has a cost, it is not cost free, some NF could pay a staff to look after 
governance, but not all can do that. The NOC could provide a scale or a gradation of those PGG 
to help to NF how to reach, minimum standards of good governance (Houlihan, 2018). Even 
more, they should start by asking NF what is and what should be governance for them. 
Looking for future proposals, Chapelett suggests that the Olympic Movement is a pyramidal 
system, so each level should push the next level for better governance, starting from the IOC to 
IF and NC, and so on. One example of this is how the policies on gender equality have changed 
the structures in the executive boards of IOC and IF.  
The government is another key stakeholder. Probably the most important after the athletes. 
They can stablish minimum parameters of how should be governed the elite sport in their 
territory. The best practices in UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are good examples of it. 
The NOC can play other critical role in order to help NF and to help itself to improve 
standards of good governance leading a public conversation of what do they consider good 
governance and why is important to have this on place. 
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5.1.6. Recommendations 
PGG should be updated, for Chapelett, they are too many not practical, that’s why he 
recommends following the principles used by ASOIF to measure governance. 
No public discussion about governance in sport have been done in Colombia. Who 
should take the first step? The PGG should have an operative goals of minimum standards as a 
starting point, according to the goals model proposed by Chelladurai (Chelladurai, 2014). The 
concept of governance may have different approaches as is pointed by (Bruyninckx, 2012). He 
shows the concept of sport governance from three different approaches; governance as 
performance, as process and governance as an ideal, or good governance.  
The professors Robert Herman and David Renz (Herman & Renz, 1999) have developed six 
theses about the effectiveness of public benefit charitable nonprofit organizations (NPOs) which 
helps from further research projects. These theses are: (a) Nonprofit organizational effectiveness 
is always a matter of comparison. (b) Nonprofit organizational effectiveness is multidimensional 
and will never be reducible to a single measure. (c) Boards of directors make a difference in the 
effectiveness of NPO, but how they do this is not clear. (d) More effective NPOs are more likely 
to use correct management practices. (e) Nonprofit organizational effectiveness is a social 
construction. (f) Program outcome indicators as measures of NPO effectiveness are limited and 
can be dangerous (Chelladurai & Haggerty, 1991). 
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Chapter 6. Conclusions 
  
This study tried to know more about the knowledge, application and perception of the 
athletes and executives about the PGG in elite sport in Colombia. Overall, most of the 
participants do not know the PGG. Into the athletes’ group, most of them do not know the PGG 
(N=50 out of 62). While into the executives’ group, is the opposite, most of them know the PGG 
(N=25 out of 29). 
With participants who knew the PGG; it was asked if they think the PGG overall apply to 
elite sport in Colombia. There were three choices. Apply, do not apply or partially apply. Only 
18 persons replied this question, for them, those principles apply; other 19 participants did not 
reply. 
The participants’ perception of the PGG in elite sport are between neutral and lightly 
negative. Athletes’ had scores covered from transparency and autonomy. The executives’ scores 
covered from athletes’ representation and solidarity. Their perception of the application of PGG 
in elite sport are all positive. The lowest score principle (athletes’ representation) refers to 
athletes’ involvement, participation and care; while the highest scored principle was solidarity, 
which is related to be equal in the distribution of his resources and develop the sport in less 
privileged regions. 
If the NOC wants to implement the PGG with NF and themselves, it should start providing 
education. Implementing policies such as good governance requires diverse approaches. The 
Sports Governance Observer provides valuable insights about implementing good governance 
policies in sport organizations. 
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Journalists and scholars point a crisis in global sport management after years of scandals and 
allegations of corruption within International Sport Organizations. They have raised public 
awareness at a national level also. Globalization, institutionalization and commercialization are 
characteristics which have brought serious problems for democracy into them (Donnelly, 2015).  
The problem with governance has been addressed by the IOC stablishing the PGG (IOC, 
2008a), other sport organizations (ASOIF, 2017, 2018), reinforced by BIBGIS project (Basic 
Indicators for Better Governance in International Sport) (Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 
2013) and SGO (Sports Governance Observer) (Geeraert, 2015) and other countries which have 
adopted codes and guidelines for improving governance. Despite those instruments represent a 
progress for good governance in sport, there is still a necessity of having education, 
appropriation, implementation and feedback activities at all levels of sport.  
When the PGG in the Olympic and Sport Movement were published, the IOC expected the 
adoption and implementation by IF and NOC under the top-to-down model and “one size fits all” 
approach. As it was showed in this research, the lack of knowledge and negative perception of 
PGG could be improved through education and increasing the participation of athletes in the 
governance of the system. 
This study highlights the necessity of athletes’ involvement in the governance of the sport in 
Colombia. Having an athletes’ commission do not guarantee the compliance of the PGG. As it 
was showed in the literature review, the existing mechanisms for legitimizing member based 
sport organisations can lead to poor governance and accepted democratic processes can be 
manipulated to suit the personal agenda of individuals over the vision of the organization 
(Minikin, 2015). 
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Appendix 
Survey 
Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in the Olympic and Sport Movement 
This survey is for ‘The Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance the Olympic and Sport 
Movement’. 
The main goal of this research is to know athletes' and executive board members' knowledge, 
implementation and perception of the PGG in Elite Sport in Colombia. 
Your participation is voluntary, there is no good or bad answers and the information collected 
will be used only and exclusively for academic purposes. It is assured your complete anonymity 
and confidentiality. Preliminary results of this study will be sent to you in November. 
This survey will take approximately 15 minutes of your time. I appreciate your honesty filling 
out all the fields. 
This study is conducted by Mauricio Hernandez ( ), currently a Master's 
Candidate in Sport Management at Seoul National University. Currently under tutoring by 
Professor Chung Gun Lee ( ) 
User characterization 
Please, answer these questions before starting the survey. 
1. What is your role in Colombia's Elite Sport System? 
• An athlete 
• An executive of Sport Federation or Colombian Olympic Committee 
2. Which of the following organizations do you belong to?  
• The National Sport Federation 
• The Colombian Olympic Committee (Only valid for Board Members) 
3. Do you know the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in sport? * 
• Yes 
• No 
Do you think the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in sport overall applies to elite 
sport in Colombia? 
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The Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement 
(2008), are a set of items of principles and elements to be mutually recognized and respected by 
the National Olympic Committee and the competent government authorities, respecting the 
autonomy of sports organisations on the one hand and good governance on the other. 
According to the Code of Ethics, all members of the Olympic Movement must adopt, as their 
minimum standard, these Basic Principles of Good Governance. They refer to: 
 
- Transparency of rules, management and managers;  
- Risk management;  
- Efficient internal communication;  
- Shared and controlled responsibilities;  
- Regular and legitimate elections;  
- The right to appeal all forms of disciplinary measures; and  
- The respect of minorities. 
Does the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in sport overall apply in Colombia's 
elite sport? 
 
• Yes 
• No 
• Partially 
 
The Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement 
(2008), are a set of items of principles and elements to be mutually recognized and respected by 
the National Olympic Committee and the competent government authorities, respecting the 
autonomy of sports organisations on the one hand and good governance on the other. 
Instructions 
Please tell us if any of the following statements are applied to your organization. If a principle 
highly applies or not, please judge on the follow scale for each category and indicator. 
1. Vision, mission and strategy  
Every Federation should consider having a clear-cut and strong statement of its vision, mission, 
and objectives which details its apical purposes and processes. The absence of such a forthright 
vision and mission statement itself can be considered a sign of ineffectiveness (Chelladurai, 
2015) 
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2. Structures, regulations and the democratic process 
The democratic processes concerns rules and norms inherent to a democratic code of conduct 
(Mouffe, 1993). In particular, they refer to participation in policy processes by those who are 
affected by the policy (Arnstein, 1969; Pateman, 1970). Democratic processes increase the 
accountability and effectiveness of organisations (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989; 
Fearon, 1999; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2004). 
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3. Highest level of competence, integrity and ethical standards 
Integrity is a set of actions against doping and any other forms of cheating in sport on the one 
hand, and the strengthening of ethics with improvements in transparency, good governance and 
accountability of sports organisations on the other. Integrity entails credibility, and the credibility 
of competitions and sports organisations is one of the three pillars of Olympic Agenda 2020. If 
the credibility of sports competitions suffers, then sooner or later the credibility of sports 
organisations will suffer. The same is true the other way around (IOC) 
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4. Accountability, transparency and control 
Accountability is the obligation of an individual or organisation to account for its activities, 
accept responsibility for them, and communicate and report about them in a transparent manner 
(IOC, 2016) 
Transparency pertains the “degree of openness in conveying information” (Ball, 2009). 
Transparency allows external actors to monitor the workings of an organisation and therefore 
decrease the likelihood of opportunistic behavior. 
Control procedures are paramount to prevent the concentration of power in and they ensure that 
decision-making is robust, independent and free from improper influence. They ensure that no 
senior official or department has absolute control over decisions, and clearly define the assigned 
duties (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000). 
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5. Solidarity and development 
Refers to expressing responsibility towards internal and external stakeholders. This involves 
practices relating to contributing to a better society and a cleaner environment by integrating 
social and environmental concerns in operations and interactions with stakeholders (SGO, 2015) 
The principle of equity in the BUPs is applied in several contexts such as the distribution of reso
urces, the organisation of competitions,  the bidding process for hosting events, and the participat
ion of athletes in competitions (Romon,  2011). 
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6. Athletes’ involvement, participation and care 
The sport organization is responsible, in particular, for the participation of the athletes in 
competitions in close coordination with other organizations (IOC, 2016). 
The sport organization should contribute to the creation of a safe environment for athletes, 
ensuring a safe and supportive environment for athletes to practice their sports in the best 
conditions.  
It is recommended that such a safeguarding policy addresses the following : 
- Specification of what constitutes harassment and abuse in sport; 
- Reporting procedure in response to an alleged incident; 
- Investigation procedures in response to an alleged incident; 
- Mechanisms for decision-making. 
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7. Harmonious relations with governments while preserving autonomy 
The autonomy of sport is often assimilated with broad concepts such as independence or 
freedom, or narrower ones such as self-government and self-determination (Thing and Ottesen, 
2010) or self-regulation of the sporting world.  
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Final Comment 
Please, let us know if you have any other comments or suggestions. We appreciate your time and 
all information provided will be kept confidential.  
Comment 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Thank you for your answers! 
The final report of this research will be presented at Seoul National University on the first week 
of December 2018. You will receive a preliminary report in Spanish, three months after all 
surveys have been answered. 
If you need any more information about this project, please contact me at mauroh06@seoul.ac.kr 
or skype: mauroh02 
For more information about the academic program you can visit http://dtm.snu.ac.kr ;  
For more information about Good Governance in Sport visit: https://www.olympic.org/good-
governance. 
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초 록 
올림픽과 스포츠 무브먼트에서의 좋은 거버넌스의 기본 원칙: 
콜롬비아 엘리트 스포츠 선수와 임원의 인식  
마오리시오 헤르난데즈 
서울대학교 대학원 
 체육교육과 글로벌스포츠매니지먼트 전공 
 스포츠에서 좋은 거버넌스는 국제 스포츠 매니지먼트의 큰 화제이다. 이와 관련한 
문제들을 해결하기 위한 제도적 노력에도 불구하고, 스포츠 행정의 스캔들은 여전히 
일어나고 있다. 스포츠에서 좋은 거버넌스의 개념은 민주적 가치와 협력 관리에 의해 
다루어진다. 이 연구의 목적은 콜롬비아 엘리트 스포츠에 있어 올림픽 및 스포츠 
무브번트에 대한 선수들과 이사회의 행정가들의 좋은 거버넌스의 기본 원칙들의 효과성에 
대한 인식을 비교하는 것이다. 표본은 62 명의 선수들과 30 명의 임원들로 구성되었다. 
응답자들은 경영, 민주주의, 통합, 투명성, 결속, 선수들의 참여와 자치의 일곱 가지 
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원칙들을 포함한 온라인 설문조사를 완료하였다. 참여자들 간 좋은 거버넌스의 원칙에 
대한 실행과 인식을 비교하기 위해 독립 표본 T 검정을 수행하였다. 전반적으로, 대부분의 
참여자들은 좋은 거버넌스의 원칙에 대해 알지 못하였다(N=54, 83%). 임원 집단에서는 
대부분이 좋은 거버넌스의 원칙에 대해 알고 있었던 반면(N=25 out of 29), 선수 집단에서는 
대부분이 좋은 거버넌스의 원칙을 알지 못하였다(N=50 out of 62). 7가지 원칙들에 대한 
차이는 모두 유의하게 나타났다. 콜롬비아 엘리트 스포츠의 좋은 거버넌스의 원칙의 
실행에 대한 인식은 선수들과 임원들 간에 통계적 차이가 있었다. 선수들은 그들의 
대표성(M= 0.028)과 자치성(M= 0.188) 원칙을 제외한 모든 영역에서 음의 평균을 나타냈다. 
임원들은 좋은 거버넌스 원칙의 적용에 대한 인식에서 전반적으로 선수들보다 나은 인식을 
가지고 있었으며, 모든 영역에서 정의 평균값을 나타냈다. 좋은 거버넌스와 같은 정책의 
실현은 다양한 접근방식을 요구한다. 만약 국가올림픽위원회(NOC)가 그들 스스로 국가 
연맹과 함께 좋은 거버넌스 원칙의 실행을 원한다면 이에 관한 교육을 시작해야 할 것이다.  
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